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Once a criminal offence is committed either the Police or the Attorney General, depending on the nature of the offence committed, has a certain amount of time to issue charges against a particular individual.

If a particular individual is charged in court with a criminal offence of which action is barred by prescription, the court either on the request of the defendant or ex officio will throw out the case and the individual will be acquitted from all the charges brought against him.

However, it is important to point out that once an individual is served with the criminal charges issued against him, the period of prescription in respect of those criminal offences becomes suspended until such time as the definite judgement is delivered.

Article 691 of Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta (the Criminal Code) provides that the prescription period shall run from the day on when the offence was completed and with regards to attempted offences from the day on which the last act of execution was committed. In the case of continuous offences, the prescription period shall run from the day of the last violation and in regard to continuing offences from the day on which the continuance ceased.

Article 692 of the Maltese Criminal Code further provides that when it comes to criminal offences, the prescription shall not start running if the offender is not known.

Article 688 of Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta (Criminal Code), provides that criminal action is barred by prescription:

1. By the lapse of 20 years for crimes liable to the punishment of imprisonment for a period not less than 20 years;
2. By the lapse of 15 years for crimes liable to imprisonment for a term of less than 20 but not less than 9 years;
3. By the lapse of 10 years for crimes liable to imprisonment for a term of less than 9 but not less than 4 years;
4. By the lapse of 5 years for crimes liable to imprisonment for a term of less than 4 but not less than 1 years;
5. By the lapse of 2 years for crimes liable to imprisonment for a term of less than 1 year OR to a fine (multa) or for those crimes subject to the punishments established for contraventions;
6. By the lapse of 3 months in respect of contraventions or of verbal insults liable to the punishment established for contraventions.

There are also exceptions to the prescription period provided for in article 688 of the Criminal Code. In such cases, the specific prescription period will be provided for by the law regulating that particular offence.

For example in the case of article 338(z) of the Criminal Code regulating the offence of when an individual fails to pay the alimony fixed by court, the law specifically states that for such offence criminal action is barred by the lapse of 6 months.

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Promises of sale are an essential stage to the conclusion of a contract of sale of immovable property. Many people will not immediately buy a house, for example – they will first enter into a promise of sale (konvenju), following which the final deed is executed and the actual sale takes place. This means that it is crucial for the individual to be aware of the rules governing the validity of promises of sale of immovable property.

For starters, the promise of sale is considered as a stand-alone contract. It must be in writing, and it must be registered with the Tax Departments. It can also be enforced. Indeed, article 1357(2) of the Civil Code makes it amply clear that, while the promise to sell is not equivalent to a sale, if it is accepted it creates “an obligation on the part of the promisor to carry out the sale, or, if the sale can no longer be carried out, to make good the damages to the promisee”. Indeed, it is not unheard of for someone to be sued because he failed to appear on a final promise of sale.

On the other hand, promises of sale can expire. In fact, they will invariably contain a clause determining by when the final sale is to be concluded, following which the promise expires and is no longer binding. If there is no such term, the law provides a three-month period within which the promise of sale is ‘alive’ and enforceable.

The Civil Code appears to regulate the ‘life’ of a promise of sale quite strictly. Article 1357(2) provides that:

“The effect of such promise shall cease on the lapse of the time agreed between the parties for the purpose or, failing any such agreement, on the lapse of three months from the day on which the sale could be carried out, unless the promisee calls upon the promisor, by means of a judicial intimation filed before the expiration of the period applicable as aforesaid, to carry out the same, and unless, in the event that the promisor fails to do so, the demand by sworn application for the carrying out of the promise is filed within thirty days from the expiration of the period aforesaid”.

From this provision it very clearly emerges that the promise of sale will expire if the promisor is not intimated judicially to fulfil his promise and that this intimation must occur before the date of expiry of the promise itself. But this is not enough. If, despite this intimation to honour his promise, the promisor fails to appear on the final deed of sale, the promisee must sue him in court before 30 days pass from the expiry date of the promise.

It would seem that the law imposes a strict framework regulating the validity of promises of sale and that, if the procedures in article 1357(2) are not followed, the promise of sale is dead and unenforceable.

What does this mean? If the promise is due to expire, but the sale still cannot occur due to some reason or other, the parties must agree to extend the promise of sale by a separate written agreement. The wording of the law seems to suggest that failure to do this and allowing the timeframes mentioned in article 1357(2) to pass without taking the required action is fatal to the promise of sale and results in its expiry. This means that a new promise of sale must be entered into, from scratch.

However, court judgments have at times held that the renewal of a promise of sale that technically expired is enough to bring that promise back from the grave – and so a fresh promise of sale is not required. The reason given for this is that in matters of contract law the will of the parties reigns supreme, and this extends to the resuscitation of expired promises of sale.

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While the subject of domestic violence arises on a plurality of occasions thereby extending its outreach to the public, somehow its struggling victims seem to remain at the mercy of their perpetrator out of the mere lack of knowledge of their remedies at law, or their overriding fear to avail of them as is their right.

While domestic violence may arise in a number of familiar settings each referred to as ‘family or domestic units’, including between persons who are or were in an informal relationship or between persons simply having a child in common, a common scenario which shall be the topic of today’s discussion is domestic violence between spouses who consequently reside in the same household – with or without descendants – where the victim is also seeking to obtain personal separation against the spouse qua offender.

As per common practice, any procedure of personal separation notwithstanding the circumstances at play is initiated by filing a letter in the Registry of the Family Court requesting the appointment of a mediator. The said letter must include the details of both parties, the date and place of marriage, and the details of the children, if any.

Assuming that both spouses are residing in the matrimonial home at the time the above-mentioned letter is lodged, a domestic violence victim is entitled to file a court application before the Family Court for the Judge overseeing the mediation to provide a provisional order (legally known as a pendente litem order) to decide whom of the spouses shall reside in the matrimonial home during the pendency of the action for personal separation. This application may also be lodged at a stage where the victim already has, prior to the institution of the application, left the matrimonial home in desperate seek of refuge.

In view of the urgent nature surrounding the application, the latter shall be appointed for hearing within four days, and, besides issuing a decree on who shall be allowed to reside in the matrimonal home, the court shall have discretion – before or after hearing the parties – to issue a protection order or a treatment order, if needed, against the perpetrator according to the provisions of the Criminal Code.

During the pendency of the personal separation proceedings, the victim may also lodge an application seeking a pendente litem order by the presiding Judge regarding who shall be entrusted with the custody of the children. Indeed, the Court may decide to limit or deny the offending party access to the children altogether, if there is sufficient proof that such access would put the children at risk.

The law also contains an ‘umbrella’ provision capable of producing similar, yet graver, effects to the one described above insofar as the custody of minors is concerned. Upon a demand of the victim brought concurrently with sufficient evidence of domestic violence, the other party – in this context being the perpetrator – may be declared unfit by the court to assume the custody of the minor children. This demand may be lodged not only during the cause for separation – with the intention of seeking a pendente litem order – but also following a judgment of separation or divorce. Furthermore, the parent declared unfit by the court to assume the custody of the minor may not do so automatically upon the death of the other parent, but shall seek the court’s authorisation for this purpose, which authorisation may or may not be granted at the Judge’s discretion.

In similar situations which however concern two unmarried parties, where evidence of domestic violence is produced in a suit – not for personal separation – but for access and/or the care and custody of minors, the court also has the discretion to issue a protection order or a treatment order in terms of the Criminal Code to protect the safety of the parties and/or the minors concerned.

Any person subject to acts of verbal, physical, sexual, or psychological domestic violence including insults or threats, assault, sexual harrassment, fear of violence, and others by a spouse or partner, are encouraged to come forward and press charges at the Gender Based & Domestic Violence Unit located in the Police General Headquarters in Floriana. Domestic violence victims may also seek refuge at victim shelters across the island.

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The law on disclosure refers to the duty of the investigative authorities to make available all material evidence which it has at its disposal to the defence before trial in order that the suspect, through legal counsel, may make full answer and defence to the charge.

The right to disclosure is quite a recent development to the right to a fair trial. Such right has been developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as a corollary to fair trial guarantees under Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the more specific requirement under Article 6(3)(b) that everyone charged with a criminal offence must ‘have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence’.

In the judgment Edwards v United Kingdom, delivered on 16 December 1992, the ECtHR stressed that: ‘… it is a requirement of fairness under article 6(1) that the prosecution authorities disclose to the defence all material evidence for or against the accused …’. In another commonly quoted judgement, namely Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom, delivered on 16 February 2000, the ECtHR re-emphasised the principle that there should be equality of arms between the prosecution and the defence. Although not explicitly expressed in the text of Article 6 of the ECHR, this is regarded as no less strong than those principles which are expressly set out therein. In the context of disclosure, this implies that the prosecution authorities should disclose to the defence all material evidence in their possession for or against the accused.

From a local context, the right of access to the materials of the case, transposed from Directive 2012/13/EU, is provided for under Article 534AF of the Criminal Code. This provision does not provide for the precise moment when such documents should be made available to the supect or to his lawyer. According to the EU Directive itself, such documents must be made available in due time to allow the effective exercise of the right to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest or detention. Each person deprived of his liberty has the immediate right to have his detention reviewed by a judicial authority and logically therefore the materials needed to contest the legality of such detention should be promptly provided to the suspect or his lawyer.

As to what amounts to ‘material evidence’, the Criminal Code does not include a definition and therefore the provision might cause confusion as to what the police should disclose and what they should not. The Directive provides that where a person is arrested or detained at any stage of the criminal proceedings, the investigative authorities must ensure that documents relating to specific cases in the possession of the competent authorities, and which are essential to effectively challenge the lawfulness of the arrest or detention are made available to the arrested person or to their lawyer.

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Precautionary acts, also known as precautionary warrants, certainly need no introduction. These measures, purposely designed in order to safeguard one’s position prior to a pronouncement of a definitive judgment on the merits of the case, have become common tools which various litigants opt to resort to and issue against their seemingly defaulting counterpart. Though much has been said about the warrant of prohibitory injunction, not much attention is given to the warrant of impediment.

Just like any other warrant of prohibitory injunction, this precautionary act aims at restraining someone from carrying out an act which is detrimental and prejudicial to the person who issues the warrant. As stipulated by article 877 of Chapter 12 of the Laws of Malta (the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure), such a warrant is issued in order to restrain any person from taking any minor outside of Malta. More often than not, a warrant of impediment is resorted to between spouses or between the parents of a particular child in an attempt to ensure that the minor remains in the country.

A person interested in suing out a warrant of this sort, has to do so by means of an application on a legally prescribed form, which has to be confirmed on oath and contain various requisite details. Such details shall include the name and surname of the minor and any other particulars that may be established by regulations, so as to enable the persons served with the warrant to establish the identity of the minor. As a matter of fact, a photo of the minor is quite often attached to the same application in order to ensure that the minor is properly identified. Moreover, the applicant filing the warrant also ought to state the reasons why he is making such a request to the Court.

For a person to have a warrant of impediment issued successfully, she or he must attain the prerequisites applicable to any other warrant of prohibitory injunction; namely, that the warrant must be issued in order to preserve the rights of the applicant and that prima facie (at face value) such person must appear to possess such right. In such a scenario, these criteria, which must be cumulatively fulfilled, denote that the person seeking the issuance of the warrant has a real fear that the minor will be taken out of the country by another person (whether a spouse, partner, or any other third person) who has no intention of returning the same minor. In fact, the law states that the warrant shall be served on the person or persons having, or who might have, the legal or actual custody of the minor enjoining them not to take, or allow anyone to take, the minor out of Malta, who would then have ten days in order to file a reply thereto.

Does this mean that during this interim period, the person against whom the warrant had been filed can freely travel with the minor? The answer to this question is ‘no’. Following the filing of a warrant of impediment, very often the presiding Judge issues an interim order which accedes the injunction requests for a provisional period – up until the request made in the warrant is decided in a definitive manner. As a matter of fact, after the warrant is filed with the Court Registry, other parties are also served; namely, the Director of Passports and the Commissioner of Police. Such a process is often straightforward when the minor whose travel is being prohibited does not hold a passport. The same does not always apply in the contrary scenario. If, before the service of the warrant on the officer charged with the issue of passports, a passport in respect of the minor had already been included in the passport of another person, such officer shall take the steps necessary to withdraw the said passport in respect of the minor, and of any other passport which includes the name of the minor, and to delete the name of the minor from such passport. However, with Malta being part of the Schengen Agreement, this provision is hard to enforce because there is no need to have a passport in order to travel to States within the Schengen Area.

When the written part of the procedure is deemed concluded, the Court would have already set a date and time in order to hear the parties make their own oral submissions as to why the warrant should be upheld or rejected altogether, following which the Court will pronounce its final decree during the sitting or otherwise in chambers. The court shall decide on its merits within the shortest time possible, but not later than 1 month from the day when the warrant had been filed and confirmed on oath, and the parties have been duly notified. It is important to emphasise that the decree issued by the Court, irrespective of whether it upholds or rejects the request, cannot be appealed from and would be considered as a final decree on the warrant of impediment.

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Governments do not always play nice. The leading rule is that the Government must always act within the strict parameters of the law: if the law does not say that it can do it, then it cannot do it. Full stop. And even if the law does confer a particular power, it cannot be exercised as the particular official deems fit. There are rules that need to be followed here too. But sometimes a government official will, perhaps unwittingly, break the rules or stray outside his powers. This would render that administrative act illegal.

An illegal administrative act allows an aggrieved individual to file an action for judicial review of administrative action in order to have the act in question declared null and of no effect. There are a number of broad categories of grounds of judicial review that can be availed of, which represent limits on how public authorities can exercise their powers.

First, the public authority must always act within the limits of the law. Each and every little thing it does must be authorised by law. If the government acts outside the law, the act is null because it was performed outside the government’s powers. This is known as the classical doctrine of ultra vires, or substantive ultra vires. Laws conferring powers on public authorities tend to be drafted quite broadly, so this is today rather vestigial, but situations may nevertheless arise particularly where there is a grey line between what falls within the competence of one government entity and what falls within the competence of a different government entity.

The second ground of review is referred to as procedural ultra vires. That is, when the government does not follow a particular procedure that the law lays down for the exercise of a particular power or performance of a particular action. Notably, it covers the so-called rules of natural justice, which permeate every decision taken that impacts the rights of individuals. These are: the duty to hear what the person has to say (audi alteram partem), the duty to not be biased (nemo iudex in causa propria), and the duty to give reasons for a decision.

The third ground covers the manner in which a power is to be exercised. Just because the government has a power to act in a particular way, it does not mean that it can do so indiscriminately. Powers must always be exercised within their proper limits and for the reason for which they are conferred. Failing this, the act will be declared null. Notably, powers must satisfy a test of reasonableness or proportionality. For example, the government cannot take a decision based on irrelevant considerations or improper motives, or be disproportionate in its application of a rule. It is the court’s duty to interpret the law and the particular facts in question to determine whether the test of reasonableness or proportionality has been met.

Of course, any act which is otherwise unlawful can be annulled, since these categories are not all-inclusive and merely a handy way of classifying different forms of unlawful administrative acts.

What effects does an action for judicial review have? The administrative act in question will be declared null and without effect. However, the court cannot itself act instead of the public authority in question. The court must declare the act null, and it is for the public authority to perform the particular act again, this time lawfully and in conformity with the court’s judgment. The court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the public authority – otherwise it would be the court itself that acts outside its powers!

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Many a time do lawyers find themselves engaged by clients seeking to avail of a civil remedy against a defendant whose residential address, or even whereabouts, are unknown. This is becoming more common in family cases in Malta involving foreign parties who would have departed from Malta after attempting to build a new life away from their home. This scenario calls for the appointment of curators, which notion is envisaged by Article 930 of Chapter 12 of the Laws of Malta.

Curators (known as kuraturi deputati in the Maltese language) are tasked at Law with safeguarding the best interests of the person they represent with utmost diligence. Where the defendant’s address is unknown by the person instituting the action, curators are bound to do their best to try to contact the person whom they represent and take all possible measures to identify their place of residence. Should they succeed, they must inform the person of any judicial act and of its contents and to continue looking after their interests with utmost diligence and responsibility. If the person’s address remains unknown despite the curator’s efforts, he is then bound to take all the necessary measures to safeguard the person’s rights.

The Law contemplates other situations besides the one mentioned in the first paragraph, in which the need for curators might arise, for reasons including but not limited to; representing the interest of any minor not legally represented, representing a person with a mental disorder or other condition that renders him incapable of managing his own affairs, as well as any interdicted person. Curators may also be called upon to represent the interests of any person presumed to be dead, where any other person claims to succeed to the rights of such person, as well as the interest of any commercial partnership or any body of persons where any of the persons vested with its representation are absent from Malta.

The demand for the appointment of curators must be lodged by means of an application to be filed simultaneously with the lawsuit (or any act whereby the action is commenced). In other situations, where the necessity to appoint curators arises after the commencement of the lawsuit, the application may be made in writing in the course of the proceedings or even by means of a verbal demand during the hearing of the suit.

In a family context, the need for curators might arise in cases where a parent of foreign nationality (called the “deserting parent”) who would have been residing in Malta together with his/her partner or spouse (called the “deserted parent”) and minor children, abandons the matrimonial home and returns to his/her country of origin, leaving the deserted parent (who is of Maltese nationality or otherwise) to raise their children without disclosing his whereabouts and cutting ties with the family altogether. In cases where the care and custody of the children is vested in both parents jointly, which takes place by way of default under Maltese Law, the deserted parent will require the deserting parent’s signature and consent prior to making certain decisions concerning the minors’ health and education. This situation has also proved to be a nuisance for parents whose minor children are not yet in possession of a passport and who must apply for a new one in order to travel for leisure or even for academic purposes.

Taking the above scenario as an example, the deserted parent must file a lawsuit in the Family Section of the Civil Court to demand the exclusive care and custody of the minors, and in parallel to the lawsuit, file an application for the appointment of curators to represent the deserting parent.

The next step after the Court makes an order for the appointment of curators, is the issuing of the banns (il-bandi) which are posted up at the entrance of the Court building. If the deserting parent, in the scenario mentioned above, has close relatives or friends who reside in Malta, a copy of the banns and the pleading must be served on said relatives or friends, and where no relations are known, these must be published in the Government Gazette and in at least two daily newspapers. This shall be done at the applicant’s expense. Any person interested in accepting the appointment shall have six days within which to do so, which acceptance is subject to the Court’s confirmation of the curator so appearing. If, however, no one lodges an acceptance to the appointment within the time frame stated above, the Court shall appoint as curators an advocate and a legal procurator from the rota established by Law.

Curators have a duty to exercise their best diligence for the benefit of the interests they represent. In the event of misconduct or negligence on their part, or should there arise any reasonable objection to the curators selected from the rota for any reason, the Court may exercise its authority to remove them from the case and appoint others from the rota in their stead.

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Amongst the various forms of guarantees available to a creditor, hypothecs are commonly resorted to as a safeguarding mechanism in view of debts owed by a debtor. Hypothecs may take either of two forms: a) General Hypothecs (burdening all the assets both present and future of a debtor) or b) Special Hypothecs (burdening one particular asset of a debtor).

Whilst both general and special hypothecs rank according to their date of registration, special hypothecs enjoy advantageous features for a creditor for they attach to a particular property encumbering it burdensomely to the extent that they remain operative even vis-à-vis third parties. This important feature of special hypothecs, which does not apply for general hypothecs, finds benefit when the property originally burdened by a special hypothec is transferred to a third party.

In order to properly understand what happens in the latter scenario, it is best to exemplify it by means of a practical example. Kickstarting the action is a relationship between two parties, a common creditor-debtor relationship who are tied together by an existing debt. In order to secure the debt, the principal debtor guarantees by means of a special hypothec in favour of the creditor. At this stage, even though the encumbered property is guaranteeing a debt, it remains in the hands and full ownership of the principal debtor. Another essential figure in the relationship is a third party who comes into the picture when the burdened property passes into his hands.

What happens in this scenario? Can the creditor go ahead and take over the property which has been securing the debt immediately?

In a situation of the sort, the long awaiting creditor would have to exercise an action, known under civil law as the actio ipotecaria. The crux of the action in fact comes to fruition when the existing debt between the creditor and principal debtor falls due and the latter has failed to rectify the same debt. In this situation, the creditor would be able to satisfy his claim by taking over the property secured by the hypothec or privilege, which is effectively in the hands of someone else.

Before exercising the action, the process is kick started by means of a judicial intimation, i.e. by serving the third party and the debtor with a judicial act calling on the same third party to discharge and release the hypothecated property in his favour or otherwise to pay off the debt. If the third party in possession of the hypothecated property has failed to discharge the debt or surrender the property and thirty days would have elapsed from when the creditor has served the debtor and the third party by a judicial act, the creditor has no other option but to institute the so called actio ipotecaria against the third party in possession by means of a sworn application before the First Hall of the Civil Court.

Having brought the actio ipotecaria, the third party does not become the creditor’s debtor, however he would have to either discharge the property which had been hypothecated by means of a special hypothec or otherwise pay off the debt from his own means. However, the third party is not obliged to monetarily pay the debt due to the creditor for his only obligation is limited to surrendering the property under Court Authority and give up its possession. It is only when the property is surrendered that his liability ceases even though the third party remains the owner until the property is sold. Up till the stage when the property has been sold by the creditor, the third party may decide to pay the debt due and regain possession of his property.

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“When you go to court you are putting your fate into the hands of twelve people who weren’t smart enough to get out of jury duty”, Norm Crosby, an American comedian once said. But is this just a light-hearted statement or a stark look at reality? The jury system has always been a subject of debate. Several jurists have suggested it should be abolished altogether. If the jury were really made up of “twelve [nine – in Malta’s case] people who weren’t smart”, it would not be a system worth retaining. But if it were made up of people who are truly able to recognize their civic responsibility and do their best to pass a fair and impartial verdict, it would be a system doing honour to the administration of justice.

What separates these two scenarios is the jury selection process. It is this process which ultimately decides whether the individuals picked to serve as jurors are “smart” enough – to use Crosby’s colloquial term – to serve the administration of justice fairly and impartially.

In Malta’s case, a jury panel is comprised of a foreman juror and eight common jurors. For one to qualify for jury service he/she must be of age twenty-one years or more and must be a citizen of Malta and residing in Malta. These characteristics are coupled with adequate knowledge of the Maltese language, good character, i.e., a clean criminal record, and competence to serve as a juror. According to the Maltese Criminal Code, a person is not competent to serve as a juror if he is interdicted or incapacitated, is an undischarged bankrupt, is a person who, owing to any notorious physical or mental defect, is reputed to be unfit to serve as a juror, or if he is a person who is under trial for any crime, until the trial has terminated.

In practice, the preparation of jury lists starts off with something that is not provided for legislatively. The Commissioner would issue a memo to all the police districts directed to the Inspectors so that they choose various people who would be deemed fit to serve as jurors. Their suitability would be decided according to the qualifications established by law. Jury lists are prepared by what can be termed as a ‘jury commission’. This commission is made up of the Commissioner of Police, two Magistrates and the Registrar of Courts. The law states that every year in August, these members draw up, according to the best of their knowledge, two lists of persons: one of persons who are qualified and sufficiently competent to serve as jurors for the trial of Maltese speaking persons and one of those persons who have sufficient proficiency in the English language, as to be able to serve for the trial of English-speaking persons. From the entire number of persons shown on the said lists a further list is drawn up containing the names of persons competent to serve as foremen who must have the added qualification of having already served in a trial by jury before the Criminal Court.

After the lists are published in the Government Gazette in August, any person who

possesses the qualifications required by law to serve as a juror and who desires to be registered or to be struck off the list of jurors, may make an application to that effect before the Criminal Court. However, an application to be struck off at this stage is only upheld if one of the qualifications required by law is lacking. The Court proceeds summarily on the application and the registrar notes on the lists any corrections which the court may order.

As for the selection of jurors for a particular trial, every month, the registrar draws from the box forty names of common jurors and ten names of foremen from the sealed boxes. If amongst the names drawn, there are people who are disqualified, ineligible or dead, such names shall be taken as not having been drawn and fresh names are drawn in their place. These persons are then summoned by writ at least four days before the day of the trial. Any person who is not qualified or liable to serve or who has special reasons for asking the court to be exempted may do so by means of an application which has to be filed within four days of the person being summoned and if the court accepts the reasons, it orders the registrar to cancel the name of such persons and to have it replaced by another name.

As to the actual composition of the jury in any given trial, the names of the persons who would have been summoned to serve are to be written on separate ballots of parchment or paper equal in shape and size. The registrar reads aloud in court the

ballots bearing the names of the foremen and then puts them in one box. The same

procedure is followed for the names of ordinary jurors, but the ballots are put into a separate box. The registrar draws first the name of the person to serve as a foreman from the box of names containing the names of prospective foremen and then he shall proceed to draw eight names (or more, depending on whether the court orders the empanelling of supplementary jurors or not). The registrar then asks first the Attorney General or the accused whether they intend or not to challenge the juror. If any person whose name is drawn is challenged, exempted from serving or does not appear, other names will be drawn in the same order, until a foreman and eight ordinary jurors (plus any number of jurors which the court would have ordered to serve as supplementary jurors) are approved.

Under the Maltese system, challenges may either be for cause or peremptory. Challenges for cause may be exercised if there is a reason for wanting the juror removed from the panel. If the court approves the reason, the juror is removed, but if it is rejected, the person is admitted. The number of challenges for cause exercisable by either party is unlimited. In the case of peremptory challenges, however, the number of challenges is limited to three each to the Attorney General and the accused. If the accused are more than three, then each of the accused is allowed two challenges each.

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