By means of Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and the Council dated 3^rd April 2014, as subsequently published in the Official Journal of the European Union on the 1^st May 2014, European Investigation Orders, became possible.

The raison d’être behind EIOs is to ensure a faster and more efficient manner of preservation and transmission of evidence situated in one territory of the Union, when that same evidence is required in another Union member state to be used in criminal trials.

This system, one may opine, has generally improved upon the previous traditional regime of letters rogatory both in terms of speed and in terms of efficiency.

Yet, this tool being only 9 years old, is far from perfect and potentially still must pass from further vetting by the Courts of Justice of the European Union.

The most notable of such tests took place on the 11^th November 2021, in the case C-852/19 as a result of a preliminary ruling request made by the Specialised Criminal Court of Bulgaria in the criminal proceedings brought against Ivan Gavanozov.

The criminal case in Bulgaria against Gavanozov centred around running an organised group and of having committed tax offences. The Bulgarian authorities, in pursuance of their investigation and eventual prosecution, wanted to effect searches and seizures and hear a witness in the Czech Republic on the basis of an EIO.

Gavanozov opined differently.  He claimed that Bulgarian law lacked any legal remedy both against the issuance of the EIO and the lawfulness of searches and seizures/witness hearings and as a result was in breach of his rights.

The Specialised Criminal Court of Bulgaria, referred the matter to the CJEU, asking:

1. whether Article 1(4) and Article 14(1) to (4) of Directive 2014/41, read in the light of recitals 18 and 22 of that directive, and Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 13 European Convention on Human Rights, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which has issued an EIO that does not provide for any legal remedy against the issuing of an EIO the purpose of which is the carrying out of searches and seizures as well as the hearing of a witness by videoconference?

2. whether Article 1(4) and Article 14(1) to (4) of Directive 2014/41, read in the light of recitals 18 and 22 of that directive, as well as Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 13 ECHR, must be interpreted as precluding the issuing, by the competent authority of a Member State, of an EIO, the purpose of which is the carrying out of searches and seizures as well as the hearing of a witness by videoconference, where the legislation of that Member State does not provide any legal remedy against the issuing of such an EIO.

The CJEU after having considered all the legal arguments brought forward by the parties and all relevant legisiation, decided by way of reply to each of the questions:

1. Article 14 of Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, read in conjunction with Article 24(7) of that directive and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which has issued a European investigation order that does not provide for any legal remedy against the issuing of a European investigation order, the purpose of which is the carrying out of searches and seizures as well as the hearing of a witness by videoconference.

2. Article 6 of Directive 2014/41, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, must be interpreted as precluding the issuing, by the competent authority of a Member State, of a European investigation order, the purpose of which is the carrying out of searches and seizures as well as the hearing of a witness by videoconference, where the legislation of that Member State does not provide any legal remedy against the issuing of such a European investigation order.

The Court in reaching its conclusion followed the Opinion of Advocate General Bobek whereby he concluded in no uncertain terms that all issued acts will, by default, be tainted because the legislation under which they were issued was itself incompatible. He refers to the ECtHR, which repeatedly found that the absence of remedies against investigative measures in Bulgaria, such as searches and seizures, is in breach of the minimum standards of Art. 13 ECHR (the right to an effective remedy).  As long as the Bulgarian legislature does not remedy this situation, Bulgaria is in constant breach of fundamental rights and can therefore not take part in the mutual recognition scheme brought about by the EIO.

The concept of mutual recognition and mutual trust has as a rule the fact that when the executing authority is required to recognise an EIO transmitted in accordance with Directive 2014/41, without any further formality being required, and is to ensure its execution in the same way and under the same modalities as if the investigative measure concerned had been ordered by an authority of the executing Member State, that authority must be sure that the issuing State complies with the EU’s fundamental rights. This includes the persons’ right to contest the need and/or lawfulness of an EIO and to obtain appropriate redress if an investigative measure has been unlawfully ordered or carried out.

Since the lack of legal remedies against the investigative measures in question and the issuance of an EIO in the current Bulgarian legislation infringes Art. 47(1) of the Charter and also rebuts the presumption of mutual trust, Bulgaria is not able to issue EIOs anymore.

Unfortunately, the situation in Malta does not differ from the situation in Bulgaria!

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As it stands today, Part Two of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) lays down a list of persons who are exempted from certain important provisions under the Immigration law. To mention a few a person who acquires the status of an exempt person, is exempted from requesting a single work permit to work in Malta.  He is also exempted from requesting a residence permit in Malta and is also exempted from seeking permission to enter Malta.  In other words, unless the Minister responsible from Immigration orders otherwise, the provisions which are related to prohibited immigrants are not applicable to the list of persons under Part Two of the Immigration Act.

The general assumption is that a citizen of Malta is considered as an exempt person but according to Article 4 of the Immigration Act, the exempt person status is also extended to persons who enjoys certain immunities and privileges by virtue of their diplomatic or consular post.  Hence their presence in Malta is regulated by the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act – Chapter 91 of the Laws of Malta.

Furthermore, according to Article 4, an exempt person status could be bestowed upon that person who is a member of the military forces of a nation other than Malta and his presence in Malta forms part of an agreement with the government of Malta or is in Malta at the government’s invitation to serve in an advise or consultative capacity.

Besides the above-mentioned categories of persons, Article 4 also grants the exempt person status to spouses of the above-mentioned persons who are still married to and living together and also to the widow or widower of a Maltese citizen, who at the time of his death the surviving spouse was still living with a Maltese citizen.

Article 4, however, does not limit the exempt person status to the above-mentioned category of persons.  Interesting to note is the fact that Article 4 (1) (f) of the Immigration Act is also being extended to the dependents of the above-mentioned category of persons. This means that according to the legislator a dependent is not only the children up to the age of 21 but also includes the adopted children and the parents or grandparents of Maltese citizens who are fully maintained by that Maltese citizen. In other words, if a third country national who is the parent or grandparent of a Maltese citizen and s/he is fully dependent of the Maltese citizen, the parent or grandparent is considered to have exempt person status and can enter Malta given the fact that s/he is the dependent of a Maltese citizen.

From a reading of Article 4, it is to be understood that once a person acquires the status of exempt person, such status is not reversible.  Article 4 (2) clarifies this matter and states that the Minister responsible for immigration may, by means of an Order, declare that the holder of such status is no longer an exempt person. However, the minister does not have the faculty to revoke without just cause but such revocation should only be made if he is satisfied that the grant of such an exemption to such person is no longer in the public interest.

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The following is the eleventh article in a series of articles delving into the GDPR, intended to give an overview of the main aspects of the provisions it introduced, retained and updated in the data privacy law regime of the European Union, and its legislative implementation in Malta. The previous article may be viewed by visiting https://azzopardilegal.eu/the-gdpr-the-new-right-to-erasure-part-v/

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In the previous part of this article we concluded our brief consideration of the right to object to processing as a basis to demand the right to be forgotten, or right to erasure as per Article 17(1)(c) of the GDPR. In this part, we shall briefly consider the exercise of the right to erasure according to Article 17(1)(d) of the GDPR. For reference, this provides as follows:

“1.   The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies:

(omissis)

(d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed;”

In reality this ground appears to be a broad ground and “unlawfully processed” could account for many scenarios. In view of that wording, questions as to interpretations arise as to the nature of what qualifies as “unlawfully processed”.

To give a theoretical example, consider a general data processing operation and the various obligations imposed on the controller and, or processor. Now consider that one particular obligation was not properly complied with, let us say the right to be informed in full prior to personal data processing as per Article 13 GDPR (we shall deal with this in separate articles), like for example on the identity of the controller for that data processing. The obligations involved are numerous, so would one failing be deemed to qualify under “unlawfully processed” and thus give rise to the possible exercise of the right of erasure under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR? The answer to that appears to be in the affirmative, in line with the general ethos and teleological interpretation of GDPR provisions. In view of most data processing practices around us, this is a good ground to explore should somebody seek to exercise the right to erasure.

Indeed, this ground is currently subject to a few preliminary references to the Court of Justice of the European Union and on which the latter would have to pronounce itself. However, such preliminary references are generally very specific, and could possibly leave the door wide open for interpretation even if the CJEU pronounces itself on them. On the other hand, the European Data Protection Board, in its Guidelines 5/2019 on the criteria of the Right to be Forgotten in the search engines cases under the GDPR (part 1) Version 2.0 adopted on the 7^th July 2020, had this to say:

“35. The notion of unlawful processing shall first be interpreted in view of Article 6 GDPR dedicated to lawfulness of processing. Other principles established under the GDPR (such as principles of Article 5 GDPR or of other provisions of Chapter II) may serve such interpretation.

36. This notion shall secondly be interpreted broadly, as the infringement of a legal provision other than the GDPR. Such interpretation must be conducted objectively by Supervisory Authorities, according to national laws or to a court decision. For instance, a delisting request shall be granted in the event where the listing of personal information has been expressly prohibited by a court order.”

Article 6 GDPR, and I would add Article 9 GDPR, provide the legal basis for the lawful processing of all personal data. Therefore, primarily, anything found to be in violation thereof would be deemed unlawful processing and in turn activate the right to be forgotten under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR. Paragraph 36 above seems to imply that any non-compliance with the GDPR would qualify as “unlawful processing”. It also goes even further by stressing the role of the Supervisory Authority, in Malta being the Information and Data Protection Commissioner, and also national laws and judicial authorities. The corollary would be that the possible breach of any national law affecting the data processing process could activate the right to be forgotten under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR.

The above would seem to be another possibility, and it compounds in the idea that data processing must be performed at all times in perfect compliance with all applicable law, or else the personal data involved is prone to be erased at the request of the data subject. With that being said, and with a lack of higher-level judicial pronouncements on the matter, the above interpretation is solely the current position of the author and it should be stressed that it does not purport to be legal advice, nor should it be taken as such.

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Picking up from part-one, the United Nations and its contracting parties sought to regulate the chemical compound Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). THC is the most dangerous chemical compound that is found in the cannabis plant.

There are hundreds of chemical compounds called cannabinoids within the cannabis plant, such as THC, CBD, CBC, CBG, CBN etc. However the most problematic cannabinoid remains THC, in fact, this is regarded as a psychotropic chemical compound that causes the ‘high’ effect.

Particularly, THC compound, functions and activates the brain’s reward system. It releases the chemical dopamine at levels that are higher than normal and as a result of this abnormal high, the brain would want a repeat of this rewarding behavior.  The effects of THC impair judgment, coordination and reaction time. On the other hand, CBD does not produce any negative effect or variation on the brain. In fact as we shall be seeing, some countries in the EU make a distinction between THC and other cannabinoids such as CBD.

The European Union Perspective

With the 2004 Framework Decision, a new revolution was set to unleash itself when the EU legislators enacted Article 2(2) whereby it was declared that the cultivation of cannabis and other drugs is not prohibited if it is committed by its perpetrators exclusively for their own personal consumption as defined by national law. In fact, this led to some Courts in the European Union, namely Spanish courts to grab the bull by its horns (pun intended) and start adopting this thinking in their judgments. As a result, Spanish courts legalized cultivation for personal use. Nevertheless, the decision to choose the way forward rests solely on each individual Member State. It is the discretion of each Member State to legalise or not or to choose the best route for its citizens.

In fact, the EU in 2016, had declared that:

“The three UN Drug Control Conventions, which provide the international legal framework for addressing the drugs phenomenon, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are the cornerstones of the global response to the world drug problem. While recognizing that drug-related issues are of cross-cutting nature and cannot be solved by a single approach or through a predetermined set of policies, the EU and its Member States reiterate that the drug control treaties must be acknowledged and respected in developing and implementing national drug policies and laws, as well as regional and international programs. We maintain a strong and unequivocal commitment to the UN conventions. There is sufficient scope and flexibility within the provisions of the UN Conventions to accommodate a wide range of approaches to drug policy in accordance with national and regional specificities.” [1]

As a result, several EU Member States are undergoing a reform in the cannabis policy. Malta became the first EU Nation to adopt a legislative regime aimed at cultivation for personal use. Luxembourg, Belgium and Spain have similar policies whereby they have decriminalized consumption and cultivation for personal use, whilst prohibiting cultivation for commercial purposes. Netherlands and the non-EU Member State Switzerland sought to adopt experimental schemes for production. On the other extreme end, Germany seems to be looking at the possibility of full legal regulation (including commercial purposes) of its national cannabis adult-use market. The latter approach would definitely lead to a revolution.

Part three of this series will deal with cannabinoids (such as CBD) other than THC. We shall see how these cannabinoids are regulated in the EU and locally.

References:

1. European Union Common Position On Ungass 2016.
2. Obligations and Flexibilities under European & International law: a path towards domestic cannabis adult-use regulation by Augur Associates 2022.

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The following is the ninth article in a series of articles delving into the GDPR, intended to give an overview of the main aspects of the provisions it introduced, retained and updated in the data privacy law regime of the European Union, and its legislative implementation in Malta. 

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We were considering the right to object in this article on the right to erasure as we are tackling the grounds for the successful exercise of the latter right. We had ended the previous part of this article, with the statement that “It is the data controller which has to demonstrate the applicability of the same limitations to the right to erasure…” 

The “limitations” refer to the requirement under Article 21(1) GDPR for the controller to stop the processing of personal data unless he “demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.”

As we have previously pointed out, the right to erasure under Article 17(1)(c) is grounded in the right to object exercisable as herein referred.

Considering the above and our previous discussion, the situation is one in which the data controller has to stop the processing upon receiving a request by the data subject for the exercise of the right to object, if only to assess the same request. Therefore, the stop is basically immediate yet temporary at first. The previously referred European Data Protection Guidelines have this to say (N.B. They refer to the exercise of the right to erasure, based on the right to object, which in practice could be made concomittantly by the data subject):

“30. The GDPR therefore changes the burden of proof, providing a presumption in favour of the data subject by obliging on the contrary the controller to demonstrate “compelling legitimate grounds for the processing” (Article 21.1). As a result, when a search engine provider receives a request to delist based on the data subject’s particular situation, it must now erase the personal data, pursuant to Article 17.1.c GDPR, unless it can demonstrate “overriding legitimate grounds” for the listing of the specific search result, which read in conjunction with Article 21.1 are “compelling legitimate grounds (…) which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject”. The search engine provider can establish any “overriding legitimate grounds”, including any exemption provided for under Article 17.3 GDPR. Nonetheless, if the search engine provider fails to demonstrate the existence of overriding legitimate grounds, the data subject is entitled to obtain the delisting pursuant to Article 17.1.c GDPR.

As a matter of fact, delisting requests now imply to make the balance between the reasons related to the particular situation of the data subject and the compelling legitimate grounds of the search engine provider. The balance between the protection of privacy and the interests of Internet users in accessing to the information as ruled by the CJEU in the Costeja judgement can be relevant to conduct such assessment, as well as the balance operated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in press matters.”

It is essential to remember that Article 21(1), and therefore Article 17(1)(c), are dependant on the fact that the data processing must have as its legal basis Article 6(1)(e) or 6(1)(f) GDPR, as we have referred in a previous part. This is important to stress, as the right to object does not apply to all data processing, in fact it refers to the limited scenarios involving Articles 6(1)(e) and 6(1)(f).

On the other hand data processing can happen on the basis of numerous legal bases found under Articles 6 and 9 GDPR, without prejudice to other data processing falling outside of the scope of the GDPR itself. Consequentially, the right to erasure as grounded on the right to object, for data processing falling within the scope of the GDPR, is likewise limited. With that said, we attempted to provide a limited theoretical overview, but the exercise of rights require particular professional attention to the case, its facts and the law in specific detail.

Moving away from the right to object and Article 17(1)(c) GDPR, in the next part we shall consider other grounds for the exercise of the right to erasure.

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Will a third-country national lose his or her long-term residence status if his or her presence in the territory of the European Union is only limited to a few days?

Under EU Law, any third-country national who has been living in an EU Member State is entitled to be granted the status of long-term residence. This status is regulated by Council Directive 2003/109 which sets out the basic principles of such status. Since it is a Directive and not a Regulation, in 2006, the Maltese Government enacted Subsidiary Legislation 217.05 to implement the provisions of this Directive.  Therefore, since it now forms part of Maltese Law, the Status of Long-Term Residents (Third County Nationals) Regulations regulates (a) terms for conferring and withdrawing long-term resident status granted in relation to third-country nationals who are legally residing in Malta and the rights pertaining thereto and (b) it also regulated the terms of residence in Malta of third-country nationals who were conferred the status of a long-term resident by another Member State.

The aim of the Directive/Maltese Law is to ensure that non-EU nationals who have lived in an EU country or in Malta for a minimum of five (5) years will have a permanent and secure residence status. It also ensures to grant these non-EU nationals equal rights to those enjoyed by EU citizens.  Furthermore, it makes it easier for these non-EU nationals to move to other EU countries to work and study.

However, like any other law, the long-term residence status regulations also provide for situations when the holder will lose the status or when such status will be withdrawn.  Article 9 of Subsidiary Legislation 217.05 lays down those circumstances under which a long-term resident shall lose his/her long-term residence status. One of the instances where the long-term residence status may be lost is when “the long-term resident is absent from the territory of the European Union for a period of twelve consecutive months”.

Nevertheless, on the 20^th January 2022 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has clarified this matter since it was requested by the Austrian Administrative Court to interpret the directive to ascertain whether the physical presence of the person concerned in the territory of the EU during a period of 12 consecutive months, even if such a presence does not exceed, during that period, a total duration of a few days only, is sufficient to prevent the loss of long-term resident status,  or whether the Member States may set additional conditions such as the condition of having had, during at least part of the relevant period of 12 consecutive months, his or her habitual residence or center of interests in that territory.

In its preliminary ruling the Court of Justice stated that except in the event of abuse, it is satisfactory, to avoid the loss of long-term resident status, for the person concerned to be present, during the period of 12 uninterrupted months following the start of his or her absence, in the territory of the European Union, even if such a presence does not exceed a few days in total.  The Court contended that both the wording and context of the provision in question and the objective pursued by the directive support such an understanding. Once long-term resident status is acquired after a period of at least 5 years, those nationals are eligible to the same rights as EU citizens as regards, inter alia, education and vocational training, social security, tax benefits and access to procedures for obtaining housing.

Moreover, the objective supports an interpretation to the effect that third-country nationals who have already proved that they are settled in that Member State, are, in principle, free, as are EU citizens, to travel and reside, also for longer periods, outside the territory of the European Union,  without that thereby entailing the loss of their long-term resident status, provided that they are not absent from that territory for a period of 12 consecutive months.

This means that the interpretation which was adopted by the Court of Justice can guarantee the persons concerned an adequate level of legal certainty when it comes to interpret Article 9 (1) (c) of the Status of Long-Term Residents (Third Country Nationals) Regulations.

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Sanctions on Russian oligarchs and the role played by the Maldives

Over the past week we have seen how the global community is reacting to the Russian invasion in Ukraine. The EU, US and UK have so far imposed a raft of economic sanctions on several Russian oligarchs and the Russian President himself.

The type of sanctions that have been imposed so far by the European Union, US and UK vary from restricting trade, freezing of assets and applying travel bans. Notably, large Russian Banks have been isolated from the US banking system, thus not being able to process large US dollar transactions. The EU have cut off a number of large Russian banks from the SWIFT payment system. Around 70% of Russian Banks use the SWIFT payment system. Essentially, this system allows banks to instantaneously communicate with each other about the amount of money to be transacted. This ban, does not mean that Russian banks are hindered from transacting with western banks, but the process of transacting is now slower, complicated and expensive.

A number of Russian oligarchs have also been directly effected seeing their assets frozen or seized by US, European and UK authorites. Other Russian billionaires who have so far not yet been sanctioned by western authorities are seeking to sell some of their assets in a move to avoid sanctions. For instance, the UK sanctions come with a 6-month transitory period (down from the original proposal of 18-month), this provides the possibility of selling property within this period and move monies abroad, out of the United Kingdom. However, in order to sell such property one would have to lift the veil on who is the ultimate owner of that property.

A few days ago, the French authorities seized a 289 foot yacht owned by a Russian oligarch that was placed on a list of sanctioned persons. The yacht was in La Ciotat for repairs and French customs officials stopped the vessel from leaving port on the basis of these sanctions. EU sanctions have also targeted certain areas within the energy sector, aviation & transport sector and technology sectors. In addition, the EU have also placed bans on visa facilitation provisions for Russian diplomats and businessman.

Why Maldives and Montenegro?

In a bid to avoid the seizure of their superyachts, Russian billionaires are ordering that their vessels sail towards Maldives and Montenegro. These two small countries currently do not have an extradition treaty with the US, although in some cases Montenegro had extradited persons to the US to face proceedings. Montenegro will not remain a safe haven for these vessels given its close ties with the EU and senior Montenegrin government Ministers have confirmed that Montenegro will join the EU in imposing sanctions.

ICC Jurisdiction – Ukraine

The Internation Criminal Court can prosecute four offenses namely, the crime of aggression, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  The question that follows is: Does the International Criminal Court (ICC) have jurisdiction over such crimes in the territory of Ukraine?  The simple answer is yes – even if Ukraine is not a signatory to the ICC statute. ICC jurisdiction would apply provided that Ukraine accepts the same. However, in practical terms, it is difficult to prosecute Russian Political leaders for such crimes unless they are found and arrested in a country that accepts ICC jurisdiction. Russia withdrew its membership from ICC in 2016.

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The beneficial impacts of modern technology do not come as a hard nut to crack for they are easily recognised and generally accepted by society. What is often bypassed however, is the question of the price paid by the effects of technological advancements and whether these are dwindling the boundary between family life and work life at the expense of our well-being. This statement finds its own special footing within the ambit of employment since employees are seemingly only a few clicks away from their employer irrespective of whether it is the weekend, whether they are on holiday or whether it is 10pm and way out of their working hours.

The nature of the world of work continues to evolve with the growing use of smartphones, tablets, and laptops by employees. With synced work mailboxes into personal smartphones, the growing use of instant messaging, and now also through the heightened use of video conferencing portals and interactive meetings, the employee is barely given time to switch off from his working environment.

This reality is what has sparked debates between European Union Member States concerning the infamous right to disconnect. Apart from the remarkability of this right in its’ own merits, one should not disregard the fact that this Recommendation was pushed for by a Maltese Member of the European Parliament. Following the adoption of a parliamentary resolution on the 21^st of January 2021, recommendations have been made to the European Commission with the prospect of issuing a directive which will see the right to disconnect serve as a foundational right to all citizens of the European Union. The wording of the resolution highlighted the problem of being constantly connected along with the high demands of the workplace together with the rising expectation that workers are reachable at any point in time can negatively impact employee’s rights, and their physical and mental health and well-being.

There is a difference between working time, during which an employee must be at the disposal of the employer, and contacting an employee outside working time, where an employee has no obligation at all to be at the employer’s disposal. It can be drawn that the main purpose behind the introduction of the right to disconnect is aimed to safeguard the employee’s health with special focus on protecting employees from the psychological risks of anxiety, depression, burnout, and technostress.

The situation is not the same in all Member States. Under the current legislation and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, employees are not required to be available to the employer on a 24/7 basis and without interruption whatsoever. Notwithstanding, the right to disconnect is still absent from Union law, and the situation amongst Member States varies widely.

As proposed, the right to disconnect enables employees to refrain from engaging in any sort of work-related tasks, activities, and electronic communication including phone calls and emails, at any time falling outside of their working time. This right shall also extend to rest periods, vacation leave, maternity, paternity or parental leave as well as public holidays. With the protection of the right to disconnect, the employee will need not fear that he will face adverse consequences for having failed to respond to an email or answer a phone call whilst outside working time. As a matter of fact, the proposed law seeks to underline this particular point – that employers should not expect, let alone require workers to be directly or indirectly available or reachable outside their working time. This restriction shall also extend to co-workers who should likewise refrain from contacting their colleagues outside the agreed working hours for work-related purposes.

It must be pointed out that this law is at present still in its recommendation stage to the European Commission and as a result has no force of law within Member States of the European Union. It is only once the prospected directive is conclusively adopted by the European institutions that it finds its applicability within the local context. That said, the crux shall ultimately rest in the hands of the Maltese legislator to transpose the wording of the directive into Maltese law. Nonetheless, the introduction of the right to disconnect is a hopeful step towards restoring the boundary between family life and work life and it is set to greatly influence the current functioning of most workplaces.

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